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Abstract: How do states in the Global South manage cross-border migration? This article 
identifies Hollifield’s “migration state” as a useful tool for comparative analysis yet notes that in 
its current version the concept is limited, given its focus on economic immigration in advanced 
liberal democracies. We suggest a framework for extending the “migration state” concept by 
introducing a typology of nationalizing, developmental, and neoliberal migration management regimes. 
The article explains each type and provides illustrative examples drawn from a range of case 
studies. To conclude, it discusses the implications of this analysis for comparative migration 
research, including the additional light it sheds on the migration management policies of states in 
the Global North. 
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Introduction 
As the international politics of cross-border mobility become more complex, there is a 
growing need to comprehend the evolution and rationale behind a variety of state migration 
management practices. Yet, the field of migration studies lacks an adequate comparative 
framework for understanding the emergence of different forms of state migration management 
regimes outside the Global North. Non-Western countries have experienced trajectories of state 
formation and development that may differ from those of industrial “northern” democracies and 
that are often shaped by factors beyond the state, including colonial legacies (Klotz 2013; 
Cooper 2014), regional dynamics (Thiollet 2011; Tsourapas 2016; Geddes et al. 2019), external 
actors (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014), and international systemic-level factors (Adamson 
2006; Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). The relationship between migration and processes such as 
post-colonial state formation, nation-building, developmentalism, and structural dependency has 
not regularly featured in theories of migration that emerged from the study of countries in post-
1945 Europe and North America.1 Yet, as we demonstrate here, such factors are crucial to 
understanding state migration management regimes in much of the world. 
In this article, we seek to better understand state models of migration management in the 
Global South. We do so by beginning with the key concept of the “migration state,” as 
developed by Hollifield (2004), which has been central to migration studies (e.g., Boswell 2007; 
Castles 2004; Freeman and Kessler 2008; Hampshire 2013; Peters 2017). We suggest that the 
extension of this concept to regions beyond Europe and North America can help shed light on 
variations in state approaches to cross-border mobility across time and space. Taking inspiration 
from the political economy literature on varieties of state capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001), we 
 
1 Scholars such as Brubaker (1992), Hansen (2000), Triadafilopoulos (2004), and Zolberg (2006b) have taken an 
historical approach to migration and nation-building but have focused, respectively, on France and Germany, 
Britain, Canada, and the United States. The literature on colonial legacies, nation-building, and citizenship in the 
Global South, such as Chatterjee (1993) or Mamdami (2018), has not been well-integrated into migration studies and 
has not focused on migration per se. More recently, however, migration histories of cases such as South Africa (Klotz 
2013) and India (Mongia 2018) have begun to bridge this gap. 
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examine variations in migration management regimes by presenting a typology of state policies 
derived from the broader literatures on state formation and the international political economy 
of development.2 As a starting point, we propose characterizing state migration management 
regimes by the extent to which they are nationalizing, developmental, or neoliberal. Our aim in doing 
so is not to produce a comprehensive typology of state migration regimes but rather to suggest 
ways of expanding the concept of the “migration state” beyond its liberal democratic variant in 
which migration management has been closely connected with broader state policy orientations 
toward markets and rights (Hollifield 2004). We aim to show that Hollifield’s concept of the 
“migration state” is historically and temporally bound and, for this reason, needs amending in 
order to achieve a more global applicability. 
Our article proceeds in the following manner. First, we discuss the need for appropriate 
frameworks for conducting global, comparative, and cross-regional research on state migration 
management policies. We note that much of the existing literature on migration and citizenship 
policy has emerged from studies of Europe and North America. Therefore, it has been shaped 
by a bias toward liberal democratic states, and its findings are not always easily transferable to 
other contexts. This bias, we argue, has been compounded by a bifurcation of the field into 
“migration” and “refugee” studies, with the latter more focused on the Global South. Second, 
we introduce Hollifield’s concept of the “migration state” and assess its utility for undertaking 
global and comparative research. By recognizing that Hollifield’s “migration state” is in actuality 
the liberal immigration state, we establish a space for identifying and analyzing other types of 
migration states. Third, we propose three additional types of migration states: nationalizing, 
developmental, and neoliberal. These three types, we suggest, allow for a more comprehensive 
understanding of trajectories of state migration management policies outside the Global North. 
After explaining what we mean by each type and providing illustrative examples drawn from a 
 
2 The literature in this area is vast, but on state formation and nation-building see Wimmer and Feinstein (2010); 
Barkey and Parikh (1991); Mylonas (2012); Smith (1986); and Vu (2010). On the international political economy of 
the Global South see Amin (1976); Hout (1993); Bates (2001); and Haggard (2018). 
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range of case studies, we discuss the implications of our analysis for comparative migration 
research, including the additional light it sheds on the migration management policies of states in 
the Global North. 
 
 
The Politics of State Migration Management 
The field of migration studies has approached questions of cross-border mobility 
management through a predominantly Western European and North American lens (Natter 
2018). This bias is reflected in the division of the field into “migration studies” – primarily 
focused on economic and labor immigration in the Global North – and “refugee studies” – 
principally concerned with forced displacement in the Global South. This bifurcation has 
resulted in, and has been reproduced through, separate journals and distinct debates around 
migrants and refugees (Black 2001). It has also contributed to a de facto split between a migration-
studies literature focused on issues of economic migration, citizenship, rights, and integration in 
“northern” democracies and a refugee-studies literature centered on humanitarian crises, mass 
population flows, and security issues in “southern” non-democracies (Betts and Loescher 2010; 
Milner 2014).  
For example, scholarship on citizenship and integration has focused disproportionately 
on Europe and North America, with comparisons of France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom examining factors like national culture and identity (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2010; Alba 
and Foner 2015). Studies of migration policies and politics across OECD countries have also 
focused on states’ economic interests in fostering labor immigration, immigrants’ impact on 
welfare state systems, and state regimes’ ability to secure the rights of immigrants and their 
descendants (Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992, 2004; Ruhs 2013). Increasingly, there has also been 
scholarly attention to migration and asylum policy within the European Union (EU), focusing on 
issues such as Brussels’ role in promoting policy harmonization across state actors; elites’ and 
professionals’ free movement within Europe; and the coordination of national approaches to 
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immigration and asylum issues via burden-sharing (Boswell and Geddes 2010; Favell 2011; 
Geddes and Scholten 2016; Thielemann 2003). Overall, then, there has been a strong tendency in 
migration studies “to focus on the consequences of immigration in wealthy, migrant-receiving 
societies, and to ignore the causes and consequences of migration in countries of origin within 
the Global South” (Castles, Miller, and De Haas 2014, 26). 
On the other hand, the field of refugee studies has tended to pay more attention to 
security, conflict, and humanitarian responses to crisis. For example, a number of studies have 
examined how refugee crises can play a role in the diffusion of conflicts across borders or lead to 
governance challenges in weak states (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1992; Weiner and Russell 
2001; Lischer 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Others have analyzed the humanitarian 
dimensions of forced migrations, including the management of refugee camps, the plight of 
stateless peoples, and the economic life of refugees (Jacobsen 2005; Betts et al. 2017). Much of 
this scholarship has also focused on the international refugee regime’s legal and political 
dimensions and treated migration flows in the Global South less as matters of state policy and 
more as matters of “global governance” (Barnett 2002; Loescher and Milner 2011; Betts 2011). 
Here, the focal point remains on the failure of states and populations in the Global North to 
adequately respond to and manage refugee crises, rather than on the study of policy-making and 
migration management in southern states. Indeed, with notable exceptions (Jacobsen 1996, 
2002), states in the Global South are often missing or lack agency in this literature, relegated to 
the backdrop on which refugee crises unfold, the passive recipients of international aid, or 
victims of the policies of more powerful Northern states (Barnett 2001; Betts and Collier 2017). 
This is not to say that there has been no attention to migration management outside 
Europe and North America. For example, one strand of literature has grown out of the study of 
diaspora politics and evolved from theorizing how migration affects sending states and origin-
country politics (e.g., Kapur 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Margheritis 2015; Heisler 1985) to 
how sending states themselves attempt to manage and control emigration, expatriates, diasporas, 
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and citizens abroad (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Brand 2006; Fitzgerald 2009; Naujoks 2013; 
Margheritis 2015; Délano and Gamlen 2014; Varadarajan 2010). Working from a political 
sociology perspective, a second group of scholars have highlighted the importance of migration 
in non-OECD states’ foreign policies (Klotz 2000; Thiollet 2011; Curley and Wong 2008). In 
addition, a strand of literature examines citizenship and membership regimes across the Global 
South (Sadiq 2008; Chung 2010a; Kim 2016; Smith 2013; Whitaker 2005). There is also a range 
of important work on labor migrants’ role in the politics and economies of the Arab world 
(Chaudhry 1997; Chalcraft 2009); policy-making in South Africa (Klotz 2013), Latin America 
(Arcarazo & Freier 2015) and Asia (Chung 2010b; Lie 2008); and regional migration systems in 
Asia and elsewhere (McKeown 2008; see also sections of various collections, e.g., Castles, Miller, 
and De Haas 2014; Geddes et al 2019). Finally, there is an important emerging literature on 
“South-South migration” which focuses on transit and host states in the Global South in an 
effort to move beyond conventional expectations of migration from poorer to richer countries in 
Europe and North America (Short, Hossain, and Khan 2017; Nawyn 2016; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2018). 
 Despite this growing scholarly interest in migration across the Global South, we still lack 
a systematic comparative treatment of the politics of state migration management that includes 
states outside Europe and North America (Boucher and Gest 2018, 22-24). Mainstream 
migration studies has relied on particular assumptions regarding state structures, interests, and 
regime types that are derived from the experiences of states in the Global North and that are not 
always applicable to countries with political systems and histories that differ from those of 
(post)industrial liberal democracies. In the following two sections, we propose a framework for 
analyzing migration in the Global South by utilizing Hollifield’s (2004) concept of the “migration 
state” as a starting point. We argue that the “migration state” has become a shorthand for 
analyzing the policies of what should more accurately be understood as the liberal immigration state. 
Expanding the concept of the migration state to include other varieties of migration 
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management regimes beyond those of liberal democratic states enhances its analytic utility and 
makes it more suitable for cross-regional (and transhistorical) comparisons. 
  
The “Migration State” Concept and Its Limits  
 The notion of the “migration state” is key for understanding the central role that 
international migration management plays in the strategies and policies of contemporary states. 
Building on earlier notions of the “Garrison State” (Lasswell 1941) and the “Trading State” 
(Rosecrance 1986), the concept, as developed by James F. Hollifield (2004), sheds light on the 
fact that the management of flows of people across state borders is as important to 
contemporary states as the management of violence or trade. Central to the migration state is the 
idea of the “liberal paradox.” On the one hand, states must respond to liberalism’s economic 
logic, which encourages trade and the free flows of goods across borders. On the other hand, 
liberalism’s political and legal logics are of territorial and juridical closure. This situation leads to 
a tension in migration policy-making in which states seek to balance the logic of markets and the 
logic of rights (Hollifield 2004, 886-7). 
 The “migration state” concept has been particularly fruitful in pointing out the central 
role that migration management plays in contemporary state policy and in understanding the 
contradictory interests facing states in managing migration flows. Yet, as currently employed, it is 
not fully portable to many contexts in the Global South because its underlying assumptions are 
biased toward the experience of liberal democratic states in post-1945 Europe and North 
America. In particular, the concept suffers from four biases that limit its conceptual portability: 
two related to the type of migration flows assumed by the model – an immigration bias and an 
economic migration bias – and two related to the type of state assumed by the model – a state capacity 
bias and a liberal bias. In other words, the framework focuses predominantly on a narrow subset 
of migration flows, states, and regime types and, therefore, is not comprehensive in its approach 
to global migration governance.  
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Immigration Bias 
In terms of an immigration bias, Hollifield’s migration-state concept centers on state 
management of migrant flows into a destination country and, thus, examines policy-making 
around questions of entry, integration, citizenship, and naturalization. Due to the need for labor 
in post-1945 Europe and North America, the regulation of economically driven immigration has 
indeed been the greatest policy concern for many states in the Global North (Castles et al. 2014, 
96-123).3 However, immigration is only one possible facet of migration policy-making, which can 
also include the management of emigration and its consequences, including state management of 
remittance flows, state diaspora engagement and diaspora management policies, as well as 
circular and transit migrations (Adamson 2019; Mylonas 2013; Gamlen 2014; Ragazzi 2014). 
For many states in the Global South, the management of out-migration as a strategy of 
economic development to both alleviate unemployment and secure foreign direct investment via 
remittances has been more salient than managing in-migration. For example, the Philippines, 
Mexico, and India are heavily reliant on labor exports and have incentives to devise policies that 
harness emigration’s potential (FitzGerald 2009; Kapur 2010; Délano 2011; Naujoks 2013; 
Ireland 2018). Hollifield’s model focuses on the management of immigration, rather than 
emigration, processes, making the framework more applicable to receiving states than to sending or 
transit states. Of course, in reality, no state is purely a migration-receiving or -sending state; these 
are ideal types. Nonetheless, due to broader patterns of unequal economic and political 
development in the post-1945 period, the focus on the politics surrounding immigration, at the 
expense of emigration, has meant that the “migration state” concept has been less applicable to 
the political realities of labor-exporting states in the Global South.  
 
Economic Bias 
 
3 Although increasingly the regulation of mixed migration flows have come to the fore as a core policy concern, as 
evidenced by the recent emergence of European and US-Mexico border “migration crises.”   
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Additionally, the migration state model focuses essentially on economic migration, with a 
particular emphasis on voluntary labor migration and the interaction between the flow of human 
labor across borders with economic markets and human rights.4 Hollifield’s model has paid far 
less attention to how states manage various forms of political and forced migration, including 
conflict-induced migration, ethnic cleansing, refugee crises, asylum-seeking, modern and 
historical forms of slavery, human trafficking, and smuggling. Here again, the focus on economic 
migration makes sense within the context of post-1945 states in the Global North, which 
experienced a period of relative stability and economic growth that acted as pull factors for both 
low- and high-skilled labor (Martin 1991; Hollifield et al. 2014, 3-35).  
The geographies of North America and Western Europe, as well as their geopolitical 
position in the post-WWII order, meant that such states were relatively removed from conflict 
zones (Zolberg et al. 1992; Loescher 1993). Large refugee inflows, such as the Vietnamese to the 
United States in the 1970s and 1980s following the US withdrawal from Vietnam, were managed 
via specific legislation – in this case, the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 
1975 (Bloemraad 2006). While the United States did not distinguish between economic migrants 
and refugees prior to 1945, the policy of non-differentiation changed following WWII, with a 
number of legislative acts (e.g., the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the Refugee Relief Act of 
1953, and the Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957) that culminated in the Refugee Act of 1980, which 
amended the Immigration and Nationality Acts of 1965 (Zolberg 2006b, 337ff). Nevertheless, 
even though the United States has taken in large numbers of refugees, the annual number pales 
in comparison to that of economic migrants (Martin 2011).5  
 
4 For example, Hollifield argues that the “rise in immigration is a function of market forces (demand-pull and 
supply-push), which reduce the transaction costs of moving from one society to another” (2004, 885). This framing 
ignores forms of migration that stem from conflict and political persecution (e.g., refugees and asylum-seekers), 
although it should be noted that Hollifield does address the spike in refugees following WWI and WWII and notes 
migration’s significance in “less-developed countries” (2004, 892-3). 
5 In September 2018, US President Donald Trump announced that number of refugees that can be resettled in the 
United States in the following year would be capped at 30,000, further scaling back American responses to forced 
displacement (Davis 2018).  
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Similarly, in Europe, the Iron Curtain dividing Western and Eastern Europe meant that 
states such as Britain, France, and Germany were largely protected from the immediate effects of 
conflict-induced cross-border refugee flows and could respond to crises, such as the expulsion of 
Asians from Uganda in 1972, from a distance. Europe’s geographic isolation changed to some 
extent with the end of the Cold War and the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, which resulted in 
massive refugee flows into the rest of Europe, including approximately 350,000 into Germany 
(Martinovic 2016). More recently, conflicts in Syria and elsewhere have led to substantial flows 
of refugees into Europe, yet the number of refugees entering Europe still pales in comparison to 
the numbers of refugees hosted by states such as Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan (Carrera et al 
2015; Ostrand 2015; Yazgan et al. 2015). Thus, Hollifield’s “migration state” model, which 
focuses on economic migration and the trade-off between markets and rights, is insufficient for 
understanding state management of conflict-driven and forced migration. 
 
State Capacity Bias 
 An additional bias in the “migration state” concept is its focus on advanced industrial (or 
post-industrial) countries with high levels of state capacity. The model rests largely on 
Westphalian assumptions about state sovereignty, which allow researchers to treat the state as a 
unitary rational actor with functioning policy-making and bureaucratic apparatuses, clearly 
defined national borders, and a coherent sense of national identity (Hollifield 2004, 887-8; Waltz 
1979). However, many states in the world do not have these characteristics and suffer from low 
levels of state capacity, ongoing internal conflict, or compromised sovereignty. These factors 
may affect their ability to formulate and implement coherent and effective migration policies, 
hindering the applicability of Hollifield’s model to weak states or states with low levels of 
juridical or Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner 1999; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Migdal 1988). 
Similarly, the migration state model assumes that states possess a basic capacity for policy 
formulation and implementation (Hollifield 2004, 893) – a problematic assumption for weak 
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states with low capacity, which may lack the ability to implement policies or rely on more 
informal mechanisms of migration control or integration into the labor market. Indeed, the 
assumption that states can formulate and implement coherent migration policies does not fully 
hold in states with high capacity, either: European and North American states, for example, 
often lack the capacity or will to deter irregular migration or enforce workplace compliance 
(Castles 2004). While this situation may sometimes be related to the so-called “migration gap” 
between the rhetoric surrounding migration policy and the actual policies and their enforcement 
(Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014), this problem can be more severe in states with low 
internal capacity. For example, in both India and Malaysia, low state capacity to register and 
document indigenous births, combined with the availability of counterfeit documentation for 
recent migrants, leads to the counterintuitive outcome of some irregular migrants having more 
formal rights than some native-born residents (Sadiq 2008). Such practices suggest that the 
migration state model’s underlying assumptions regarding a state’s capacity to formulate and 
implement policy pose yet another barrier to its portability to a variety of contexts in the Global 
South.  
 
Liberal Bias 
Finally, the migration state model has largely been derived from, and applied to, states 
with liberal democratic regime types and market economies rhetorically committed to individual 
rights (Natter 2018). Hollifield’s work, for example, focuses explicitly on the migration policies 
of “advanced industrial democracies” – largely the United States, France, and Germany.6 Within 
this context, states face a “liberal paradox” with respect to migration policy – they must devise 
policies that allow states to capture the benefits of global markets while still protecting individual 
rights (Hollifield 2004, 886-7). Yet, not all states have liberal regime types or prioritize markets 
and rights (Chung et al. 2018). Thus, the migration state model, in its current form, has limited 
 
6 More recently, Hollifield and Sharpe (2017) applied the “migration state” framework to Japan. 
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applicability to states across a variety of non-liberal regime types, such as illiberal democracies, 
authoritarian regimes, autocracies, and anocracies, which may have policy goals or political 
systems that diverge from those of states in Western Europe and North America and may not be 
beholden to liberal norms.  
For example, developing states’ migration policy in much of the post-WWII era has 
centered on the prevention of “brain drain” via restrictive emigration practices (Hirschman 1978, 
p. 101). The Eastern European communist bloc focused on preventing emigration to the West 
while supporting the circulation of skilled migrants across the communist world, as per the ideals 
of socialist internationalism (Applebaum 2019).  Many states in the Global South, including Gulf 
Cooperation Council states and Central Asian republics, have programs that encourage their 
citizens to study internationally but also prevent them from migrating permanently by tying them 
to a commitment to return following study (Del Sordi 2017; Perna et al. 2014). Some autocratic 
regimes continue to consider migration a politically suspect act and try to prevent citizens’ 
freedom to travel via a number of means (Alemán and Woods 2014). Moreover, liberal norms 
can be used for exclusionary and identarian purposes, leading to deep contradictions around 
migration even within liberal states (Adamson et al. 2011). 
The desire to procure material gains via emigration often contrasts with non-
democracies’ desire to politically control their citizens within the nation-state’s borders (Alemán 
and Woods 2014). In line with Hollifield’s argument that liberal democracies are characterized by 
a “liberal paradox,” non-democratic migration states in the Global South frequently face an 
illiberal paradox (Tsourapas 2019a): on the one hand, they seek to restrict emigration for political 
and security reasons; on the other hand, they need to encourage emigration for economic 
reasons to attract remittances, tackle structural problems of unemployment and overpopulation, 
or reap other material benefits associated with cross-border mobility (Mosley and Singer 2015). 
A number of Global South states respond to this illiberal paradox by restricting emigration: at 
times, Cuba, Uzbekistan, North Korea, and Soviet bloc states have imposed firm control on 
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citizens’ emigration, prioritizing political repression over material gain (Dowty, 1989). For China, 
it was only during the post-1978 period of “reform and opening up” that the ruling Communist 
Party agreed to relax its restrictive emigration laws (Liu 2009). Other developmental migration 
states’ response to the illiberal paradox is to encourage emigration but to attempt to control 
political activism abroad: Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia encouraged their citizens’ emigration for 
economic reasons but also developed intricate mechanisms of monitoring and controlling 
citizens’ behavior abroad (Brand 2006). Eritrea, with one third of its citizens residing outside the 
country, has established coercive transnational institutions to ensure continuous inflows of 
remittances and tax income (Hirt and Mohammad 2017). Broadly, then, non-democracies that 
allow, and benefit economically from, citizens’ cross-border mobility tend to also develop 
intricate “extraterritorial authoritarian practices” that aim to “manage and offset the risks 
population mobility poses to them” (Glasius 2018, p. 179). 
 
These four biases – an immigration bias; an economic migration bias; a state capacity bias; and a 
liberal bias – all point to the limitations of the existing migration state model, which has emerged 
inductively from the study of migration management policies in the Global North. Although the 
four characteristics converge in post-1945 states in Western Europe and North America, there 
are many examples of states that represent only some or none of these characteristics. For 
example, India provides an example of a liberal democratic state with weak capacity to manage 
and implement formal migration systems (Sadiq 2008); Mexico, which successfully implemented 
liberal democratic practices only recently, has historically managed not only immigration but also 
emigration and transit migrant flows (FitzGerald 2009). Therefore, we argue, it is useful to 
further unpack the notion of the “migration state” in ways that extend its relevance to other 
settings and contexts. Just as the “variety of capitalism” literature has observed that state 
management of relations between labor and capital varies across states to include both liberal 
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and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), so too is there significant variation 
across states in their migration management regimes.  
 
Varieties of Migration States: Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal 
Based on the above discussion, we can see that the “migration state” concept refers, in 
actuality, to a relatively narrow set of migration management regimes that may be best 
understood as those of immigration policies for economic migrants in advanced liberal 
democracies. In other words, the “migration state,” as it has been used, should be more 
accurately understood as the liberal immigration state. As a means of strengthening the concept’s 
applicability across time and space, we extend it to a variety of state migration management 
regimes that would be more applicable to contexts in the Global South. 
We propose that the categories of nationalizing, developmental, and neoliberal migration states 
provide a framework for applying the “migration state” concept to a greater range of historical 
and geographical cases. The categories recognize the need to look historically at processes of 
state formation and development, while considering broader structural trends and international 
factors, such as changing global relations between capital and labor, that shape state choices 
(Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 2005; Peters 2017).7 The three categories are derived from both 
inductive and deductive reasoning, drawing on a combination of the literatures on nation-
building, developmentalism, and neoliberalism and from our critique of the migration state 
framework. As such, we propose these models as an exercise in grounded theory (Strauss and 
Corbin 1997; Glaser 2017), with the aim of producing new categories. In the remainder of this 
article, we illustrate the categories’ logic by using a range of examples to show their broader 
applicability.  
All three of these additional varieties of migration states pose challenges to Hollifield’s 
liberal migration state because their migration policies and practices are not guided by concerns 
 
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this important point. 
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with trade-offs between markets and rights. Furthermore, the nationalizing migration state poses a 
challenge to the dominance of economic and market concerns as motivating factors for state 
migration policies, highlighting instead the political and ideological roots of state migration 
policy and the prevalence of state-driven instances of forced displacement. In the case of the 
developmental migration state, the model challenges the overwhelming focus on immigration by 
pointing to the important role of emigration and labor export in the economic development 
strategies of democratic and non-democratic states in the Global South. Finally, the neoliberal 
migration state calls into question the centrality of rights-based migration policy-making and 
demonstrates how variations in state capacity (and autonomy) lead to differences in how states 
commodify cross-border migration flows. More broadly, the policies of these three types of 
“migration states” emerge not just from domestic politics and preferences but are embedded in 
broader structural and international trends, such as imperial collapse and decolonization; 
ideologies of developmentalism; and the global rise of deregulation and commodification, all of 
which are closely associated with a number of international actors, such as powerful “Northern” 
states and international organizations. 
Furthermore, these three forms of migration states are meant to be ideal types – in the 
Weberian sense – and are designed to be indicative (rather than exhaustive) of the alternative 
logics that might drive state migration policy across a range of cases. As such, they should be 
treated as heuristic tools that help contextualize and illuminate underlying logics of state 
migration policies across different contexts. In reality, the categories may overlap or merge into 
one another, and any particular state may have contradictory policies that correspond to 
particular aspects of one or more ideal type. With these caveats, the rest of this section outlines 
and illustrates these three additional types of “migration states.”  
 
Nationalizing Migration States: Population Exchanges, Expulsions, and Ethnic “Return” 
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The concept of the state that informs Hollifield’s “migration state” is the modern 
sovereign nation-state, defined by clear boundaries and a national identity – the same model that 
pervades much of the mainstream literature in international relations and political science 
(Agnew 1994). While this model may be suited to understanding many aspects of policy-making 
in post-1945 industrial democracies, it sidesteps how the vast majority of the world’s states came 
into existence after 1945.8 Migration studies has under-theorized the role that population 
movement and control in general, and policies of forced migration in particular, have played in 
larger processes of state formation and nation-building, especially in post-colonial and post-
imperial contexts (Klotz 2013; Zolberg 1983). State- and nation-building processes have been 
responsible for significant human population flows during the 20th century and need to be 
understood as a sub-category of state migration management policies. The ideology of 
nationalism, and the political impetus “to make a state correspond to a nation,” shaped post-
colonial and post-imperial state-building around the world and in different contexts (Cooper 
2018: 95). In nationalizing migration states, the dominant logic is identity based and politically 
driven, rather than one of markets and rights.  
One of the most spectacular examples of the use of mass migrations in the formation of 
new states occurred with the 1947 partition of British India into the newly formed states of India 
and Pakistan. An estimated 10-12 million refugees were created, with around 7,226,000 Muslims 
moving to Pakistan and approximately 7,249,000 Hindus and Sikhs crossing from Pakistan to 
India (Talbot and Singh 2009). A further partition of Pakistan in the context of the 1971 
Bangladesh Liberation War led to an additional outflow of 10 million Bengali refugees to 
neighboring India (Totten and Bartrop 2008).  
 
8 In 1945, the United Nations had 51 member states, compared to 193 in 2018. The vast majority of this growth has 
come from the emergence or independence of new states in the international system: 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html 
[accessed 29 April 2019]. 
17 
 
Earlier in the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire engaged in population exchanges 
with Bulgaria and Greece in 1913 and 1914, respectively. At the same time, approximately 
350,000 people were forced to move between Greece and Bulgaria as part of a 1919 bilateral 
agreement (Robson 2017, 73; Içduygu and Sert 2015). More broadly, the transition from the 
Ottoman Empire to the modern Turkish Republic can be characterized as a period of nation-
building via the state management of forced migration, including population exchanges, 
expulsions, and ethnic cleansing (Yildirim 2007). Some of these expulsions pre-date the 
emergence of modern Turkey – most famously, the Armenian expulsions between 1915-17 and 
smaller population transfers of Armenians to Syria and Lebanon in 1921-22 (Robson 2017, 78). 
The founding of the new Turkish Republic, however, saw rounds of deportations in the form of 
the 1923 Greek-Turkish population exchange, in which 1.2 million Christian “Greeks” in 
Anatolia were denationalized and exchanged for 350,000 Muslim “Turks” from Greece 
(Hirschon 2003; Triadafilopoulos 1998). At the same time, immigration policies in the early 
Republican period promoted the development of an ethno-religiously defined Turkish identity, 
encouraging the arrival of over 700,000 Muslims from various Balkan states, including Greece, 
Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria (Akgündüz 1998; Kirişci 2000). The transition from empire 
to nation-state, thus, involved the establishment of a migration management regime based on the 
homogenization of a population within clearly defined territorial borders. 
Further examples of the mass expulsion of populations during processes of state-
formation and nation-building in the Middle East include the approximately 750,000 Palestinians 
expelled in 1948 with the founding of the state of Israel – a process that was legitimized in part 
by the example of “nation-building exchanges such as the postwar expulsion of Germans from 
Poland and Czechoslovakia” (Robson 2017, 133-4). Throughout the 20th century, most of these 
flows were managed by newly formed states, sometimes with the assistance of international 
actors, such as the Mandatory Powers of the League of Nations, which viewed the “unmixing” 
of populations “as a legitimate, internationally sanctioned form of state building” (Robson 2017, 
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74). The exodus of approximately 800,000 French citizens from Algeria in 1961-2 followed the 
Algerian War of Liberation (McDougall 2017, 221). In addition, there were multiple cases of the 
expulsion or mass exodus of approximately 850,000 Jewish residents from Arab states in the 
1950s through 1970s during periods of Arabization that accompanied postcolonial state-building 
processes (Cohen 1973). The reshaping of the Arab Middle East along ethnic lines also led to the 
expulsion of other minorities (Sharkey 2017). For example, the introduction of nationalization 
policies by Egypt’s Nasserite regime, particularly the 1957 Egyptianization Laws, contributed to 
the decline of the country’s European communities; by the time of Nasser’s death in 1970, 
Egypt’s once-thriving Greek and Italian communities were almost non-existent (Kazamias 2009; 
Gorman 2015). The regional dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict also marked the end of 
Egypt’s thriving Jewish community (Laskier 1992), as a community of over 80,000 in 1948 was 
reduced to six elderly women by 2016 (AFP 2017).  
Similar processes took place in other cases of decolonization. At the end of the 
Portuguese empire in the 1970s, approximately 500,000 European retornados “returned” to 
Portugal, despite never having lived there (Lewis and Williams 1985). Around 90,000 Europeans 
left the Congo for Belgium in 1960 (Stanard 2018).9 Nationalizing processes in Uganda under Idi 
Amin led to the mass expulsion of approximately 80,000 citizens and residents of South Asian 
descent in 1972 (Adams and Bristow 1979). Population expulsions and returns also formed key 
components of post-imperial nation-building in Japan, where the ethnically Korean population 
was forcibly repatriated to Korea after WWII (Ryang 2013; Morris-Suzuki 2007). 
Forced expulsions, population exchanges, and refugee flows are not usually studied as 
“migration policy” and are instead framed as ethnic cleansing or genocide (Brubaker 1998). 
Nevertheless, if migration is defined as the movement of people across borders, these types of 
mobility constitute significant examples of state-driven forms of migration, particularly 
throughout the twentieth century. In these cases, migration policy has not primarily been used as 
 
9 “Flight from Angola,” The Economist August 16, 1975. 
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a tool of economic development or a means of filling gaps in the labor market, but rather as a 
means of forcibly constituting national populations in an attempt to create ethno-religio-national 
homogeneity (Rae 2002; Vigneswaran 2013). 
 
The Developmental Migration State: Labor Emigration and Remittances 
 The migration state model, as applied to North America and Europe, has assumed that 
advanced industrial states rely on immigration as part of a strategy of economic growth – past 
labor shortages in Europe and the United States have encouraged the recruitment of both high- 
and low-skilled foreign labor. Yet, the relationship between cross-border mobility and economic 
growth is demonstrably different in many states of the Global South, which have adopted 
developmental strategies that rely heavily on labor export via emigration. This interplay between 
migration management and development has been examined under the framework of “brain 
gain” and, most prominently, economic remittances (Castles, Miller, and De Haas 2014, 75–83). 
Research has long established the importance of capital inflows for sending states, particularly in 
the Global South (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015; 
Mosley and Singer 2015). Migrant remittances constitute a source of foreign exchange and 
produce multiplier effects on the aggregate economy (Kapur 2010), while decreasing demand for 
social spending (Doyle 2015). In 2018 alone, the World Bank estimated official migrant 
remittances to low- and middle-income countries to have reached a record high of $529 billion; 
by 2019, remittances are expected to become these countries’ largest source of external funding 
(World Bank 2019). Numerous states of the Global South also encourage citizens’ pursuit of 
education and training opportunities abroad as part of their modernization or industrialization 
strategies, particularly in Africa and the Middle East (Guruz 2011). A key strategy of 
developmental migration states involves the use of migration management as a “safety valve,” 
encouraging an outflow of (excess) domestic labor, with the aim of reducing labor surpluses and 
easing accompanying socio-political and economic pressures (Appleyard 1989). 
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In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey, for example, used labor emigration as a means of 
reducing unemployment and increasing foreign exchange reserves through remittances, which 
were also used to keep the Turkish lira’s value artificially high (Martin 1991). Additionally, 
Turkish migration policy was viewed as a way of ensuring that rural migrant workers acquired 
new skills and training that could be tapped upon their return, when they would bring foreign 
capital to invest in their local communities (Sayari 1986, 92–3). A similar developmental rationale 
governed the migration state in North Africa: Tunisia and Morocco, for instance, identified 
powerful economic incentives in promoting labor emigration to Western Europe, primarily to 
tackle high unemployment and attract remittances (Brand 2006, 17). The Libyan migration state 
under Colonel Gaddafi expected gains in human capital, offering scholarships to promote 
student mobility and encourage citizens’ training abroad (Tsourapas 2019a).  
Between 1942 and 1964, the Mexican developmental migration state negotiated the 
outflow of Mexican labor into the United States under the auspices of the Bracero Program, 
which was designed “to trade a pool of unemployed laborers for a source of remittances and 
modernizing influences” (FitzGerald 2009, 48). Following the Bracero program’s end, the 
Mexican state continued to encourage emigration as “an economic escape valve” and designed 
initiatives such as the “Tres-por-Uno” (3 x 1) matching funds program to encourage emigrant 
investment in local development schemes (Ibid., 57-58). The Philippines is perhaps the 
emblematic country that has used emigration as an explicit developmental strategy, sending 
approximately 800,000 citizens abroad annually on temporary labor contracts and developing 
elaborate governance structures to liaise with and protect the rights of its diaspora (Ireland 2018; 
Tyner 2004). Like other East Asian states in the 1970s, such as South Korea, the Philippines 
followed a developmental state model, while explicitly focusing on emigration’s role in 
strengthening the national economy: it established an official “overseas employment program” in 
1974, with basic regulatory institutions and, by 2009, the Philippines was receiving over US $19 
billion per year just from overseas female workers (Ireland 2018, 325-327). A similar strategy of 
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harnessing emigration’s power as a development tool has been used by a number of African 
states. For example, Cameroon has received tens of millions of US dollars annually from its 
diaspora since the 1990s, including an estimated $244 million in 2016, and the Cameroonian 
diaspora or “bushfallers” have played a crucial role in development there (Awang 2013; Malit 
and Alexander 2017). 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, as well as poorer Arab states such as Egypt, 
traditionally promoted labor migration to the oil-producing Arab states not solely to attract 
remittances but also to curb overpopulation and unemployment (Weiner 1985; Kapur 2010; 
Tsourapas 2018). In 2018, 29.1 million foreign nationals resided across the Gulf Cooperation 
Council states, constituting 51.9% of the six oil-producing states’ total population.10 
Developmental migration states have created numerous instruments to regulate economically 
driven mobility, including bilateral and multilateral treaties (Fargues and Shah, 2018). In 2015, 
the Indian Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs developed “e-Migrate,” an online database which 
aimed to increase transparency and enhance labor protection by registering and inspecting 
foreign companies that recruit Indians abroad.11 Thus, for developmental migration states reliant 
on remittances, the management of labor emigration and the resulting transnational diaspora 
populations constitutes a key element of the “migration state” (Gamlen 2008; Adamson 2016). 
 
The Neoliberal Migration State: Capitalizing on Cross-Border Mobility 
The migration state model rests on the assumption that states have a degree of capacity 
and autonomy to independently formulate and develop their migration policy. For advanced 
liberal democracies, globalization has created economic incentives for practices such as 
outsourcing manufacturing to countries with lower labor and regulatory costs (Peters 2017). Just 
 
10 See, for more information: https://gulfmigration.org/gcc-total-population-and-percentage-of-nationals-and-non-
nationals-in-gcc-countries-national-statistics-2017-2018-with-numbers/ (Accessed on September 4, 2019).  
11 See, for more information: https://emigrate.gov.in/ext/about.action (Accessed on September 4, 2019). 
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as state economies in the Global North have become transnational, however, so has the 
migration policy of Global South states. Increasingly, states have an incentive to capitalize on 
cross-border mobility, treating both voluntary and forced migration as a commodity that can be 
utilized to enhance state revenue and power. While the developmental migration state aims to 
employ emigration policy as a means of exporting labor and relieving domestic socio-economic 
pressures, the neoliberal migration state is more explicit in its monetization of migration flows. 
Two examples illustrate the workings of neoliberal migration states: the emergence of 
citizenship-by-investment schemes and the use of refugees and migrants as a means of extracting 
revenue from external bodies such as states or international organizations. In these two examples 
of neoliberal forms of migration management, states strategically use population mobility as a 
means of generating revenue.  
In the first case of “citizenship-by-investment” schemes, states literally sell membership 
in their polity (Surak 2016; Abrahamian 2015). The use of economic capital as a determining 
factor of membership in a political community constitutes a commodification of citizenship by 
states that have succumbed to the market’s logic (Shachar and Hirschl 2014; Tanasoca 2016). 
Citizenship-by-investment schemes represent the opposite end of the spectrum from the 
nationalizing migration state, as they “speak to the very arbitrariness of the concept of belonging 
to a nation to begin with” (Abrahamian 2015, 154). Under this arrangement, modern citizenship 
is shaped by “universalizing [and contending] criteria of neoliberalism and human rights” (Ong 
2006, 499), within the context of a broader neoliberal shift toward the “contractualization of 
citizenship” by states that hold the “market value [to be] the chief criterion for membership” 
(Somers 2008, 5). Citizenship-by-investment schemes reshape the link between citizenship and 
rights that defined Hollifield’s liberal migration state model. They are manifestations of the 
commodification of rights and the transformation of states into entrepreneurial actors in which 
belonging is redefined in neoliberal terms (Brown 2015; Surak 2020). 
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The proliferation of “citizenship-by-investment” schemes can be partly explained by the 
revenue they generate for economies in the Global South. A number of Caribbean nations 
charge $250,000 to provide visa-free access to Europe: in St. Kitts island, the citizenship-by-
investment scheme “has brought about an economic miracle,” with the sale of passports now 
constituting 25% of the country’s GDP (Surak 2016, 39). Since 2017, the Republic of Vanuatu 
has offered citizenship for $150,000, promising “visa-free entry to 26 Schengen Area countries as 
well as UK, Russia, Hong Kong & Singapore.”12 The Vanuatu Information Centre promises that 
the approval process “takes between 30 to 60 days to complete, making it one of the fastest 
processing times in the World.”13 Cyprus’s “golden passport” scheme has been running since 
2013 and awards Cypriot (and European) citizenship for an individual investment of €2 million – 
a process not dissimilar from Malta’s ongoing citizenship-by-investment scheme (Antoniou 
2018). In 2018, Turkey revised its national scheme (established in 2016), allowing foreigners to 
become citizens if they own property worth $250,000 (Cağlayan 2018). 
Beyond the commodification of citizenship, the neoliberal migration state also promotes 
the monetization of other forms of cross-border migration flows, such as forced migration. The 
increasing reluctance of states in the Global North to accept refugees has led to the emergence 
of a range of strategies aimed at keeping forcibly displaced populations in the Global South, 
including providing material support to host states of first asylum (Loescher 1993; FitzGerald 
2019). Formalized via migration “deals” and refugee “compacts,” the commodification of forced 
displacement encourages refugee rent-seeking behavior across Global South states, which seek to 
attract external economic support in order to continue hosting refugee populations within their 
borders (Tsourapas 2019b). 
The trend toward refugee rent-seeking behavior is particularly evident in the context of 
the Syrian refugee crisis: Turkey, which has come to host approximately 3 million displaced 
 
12 See, for more information: https://www.vanuatu-citizenship-program.com (Accessed on September 4, 2019, 
2019). 
13 See, for more information: http://vic.vu/citizenship/(Accessed on September 4, 2019, 2019). 
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Syrians, successfully negotiated with the EU in 2015 and 2016 to receive approximately €6 billion 
in exchange for controlling emigration and keeping refugees in situ (Sert and Yildiz 2016; Özden 
2013; Içduygu 2015; Greenhill 2016). Jordan and Lebanon negotiated similar agreements, aimed 
at ‘turning the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity’ (Tsourapas 2019b).  
Between 2013 and 2014, the EU concluded a number of “Mobility Partnerships” with Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Jordan that offered certain perks to these states in return for securitizing irregular 
migration and refugee flows in the European periphery (Collyer 2012).  
These agreements followed the example of Spain’s first Africa Plan, which saw the 
doubling of Spanish development aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 2006 and 2010 (Andersson 
2014, 40-42). Senegal, in this context, leveraged Spanish concern about irregular migration to 
secure a €20 million migration-linked development package in 2006 (Ibid., 40-42). Under 
Gaddafi, Libya obtained €2 billion from the EU in 2005 to prevent emigration to Europe 
(Greenhill 2010, p. 332). On the other side of the world, the tiny island nation of Nauru in 2017-
18 earned two-thirds of its entire $170 million revenue in 2017-18 from detaining and processing 
migrants for Australia in the form of “direct aid, resettlement and visa fees for refugees, fees to 
the Nauru Regional Processing Center Cooperation, or reimbursements to Nauru’s 
government.”14 Between 2001-7 Nauru, Manus and Christmas Island were able to leverage $1 
billion in revenue from Australia to host and process approximately 1,700 asylum-seekers, 
amounting to more than $500,000 per asylum seeker.15 The trend of capitalizing on irregular 
migration and forced displacement for material gain in the Global South is, of course, directly 
related to Global North states’ policies of externalizing and outsourcing migration management 
 
14 Ann Davis and Ben Doherty, “Nauru: A Nation in Democratic Freefall Propped up by Australia.” The Guardian 
September 2, 2018: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/03/nauru-a-nation-on-the-cusp-of-
democratic-calamity (Accessed on September 4, 2019). 
15 Connie Levett, “Pacific Solution Cost $1 Billion.” Sydney Morning Herald, August 25, 2007, as cited in Greenhill 
2010, 329. 
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(FitzGerald 2019; Grewcock 2014).16 Thus, the proliferation of citizenship-by-investment 
schemes and the strategic use of cross-border migration flows as a means of generating revenue 
from external bodies points to the emergence of neoliberal forms of migration management. 
 
  
Conclusions 
In this article, we have suggested that the “migration state” concept is a useful tool for 
engaging in comparative analysis of state migration across time and space. Yet, in its current 
usage, the concept has limited applicability, due to its focus on economically-driven immigration 
in advanced liberal democracies. Our article proposes a means of extending Hollifield’s (2004) 
“migration state” concept to contexts beyond the Global North by introducing a typology of 
nationalizing, developmental, and neoliberal migration management regimes. The nationalizing model 
emphasizes the use of cross-border mobility in nation-building processes, drawing attention to 
the political and ideological roots of state migration policies and the prevalence of state-led 
policies of forced migration. The developmental model points to the important role of emigration 
and labor export in the economic development strategies of many states around the world. The 
neoliberal model highlights how states monetize cross-border migration flows via citizenship-by-
investment policies and the commodification of forced displacement. These migration state 
models are meant to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive, and to demonstrate how a critical 
engagement with, and extension of ,the “migration state” concept can make it more applicable to 
cases across the Global South. Extending the migration state concept opens up new directions in 
comparative research on the state’s role in shaping migration policy, including when and why 
particular states move between the categories of nationalizing, developmental and neoliberal, as well as 
the ways these categories relate to one another over time. 
 
16 This situation can lead to perverse consequences, such as the creation of financial incentives for countries to 
inflate the numbers of refugees and migrants. See, for example, discussions of Uganda and Somalia in Okinor (2018) 
and Kibreab (2004). 
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While our primary focus in this article has been on expanding the “migration state” 
concept in ways that make it more applicable to cases across the Global South, our proposed 
typology has additional advantages. To start it facilitates historical comparisons. “Liberal” 
migration states have also engaged in nationalizing practices of racial and ethnic exclusion, 
including the use of forced migration and displacement toward indigenous and other populations 
and via policies such as the US Chinese Exclusion Act and the White Australia Policy (Zolberg 
2006b; Triadafilopoulos 2004; FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014; Jupp 2002). European states 
relied heavily on emigration as part of their developmental practices and as a way of managing 
“surplus populations” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries – long before they switched to 
being labor-importing following WWII (Zolberg 2006a). Neoliberal practices of externalization 
and outsourcing of migration management to private entities, such as shipping companies, were 
prevalent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Zolberg 2000; Feys 2010). Moreover, the 
instrumentalization of citizenship that is a feature of contemporary citizenship-by-investment 
schemes has affinities with ancient Roman models of citizenship that emphasized access to a set 
of goods rather than political belonging (Joppke 2018).  
Equally important, this typology helps us better understand and engage the globally 
entangled nature of migration regimes. The nationalizing migration state in the Global South 
emerged in part due to systemic pressures emanating from Europe to adopt the national state 
model. Similarly, the developmental migration state, with its focus on emigration, is the mirror image 
of labor-receiving immigration states – all immigrants are also emigrants. Placing immigration and 
emigration models side-by-side allows us to see the relationship between migration and larger 
dynamics of economic dependency and inequality. The emergence of the neoliberal migration state 
can also be tied to larger dynamics of global inequality, in which migration restrictions in the 
Global North create global markets for passports via citizenship-by-investment schemes as well 
as incentives for states in the Global South to monetize refugees and other migrants. 
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Finally, the typology we offer here has relevance for understanding the emergence of 
illiberal forms of migration policy in both the Global North and South. The contemporary 
politicization of migration issues in countries such as Britain, the United States and Hungary 
suggests the ongoing relevance of the nationalizing impulses to the politics of migration in states 
in the Global North. The emergence of points-based migration systems in Canada and elsewhere 
to attract high-skilled workers in the context of the global knowledge economy can be seen as a 
developmental form of migration management; whereas outsourcing the management of irregular 
migration by states in the Global North to private detention firms and states beyond their 
borders shows the contemporary global prevalence of neoliberal forms of migration 
management.17 Therefore, the need to expand the “migration state” concept beyond its liberal 
democratic variant may be increasingly necessary for understanding the evolving migration 
policies of states in North America and Europe, as well as states in the Global South. Especially 
amidst the current global resurgence of populist nationalism, it is important to recognize that the 
contemporary “migration state” is not always a liberal democratic one.  
 
  
 
17 States in the Global North also have the functional equivalent of citizenship-by-investment schemes in the form 
of investor visa programs, such as the US E-B5 Investor Visa program: https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-
states/permanent-workers/employment-based-immigration-fifth-preference-eb-5/about-eb-5-visa-classification 
(Accessed September 6, 2019). 
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